One day in the 1970s, the officers of a Red Army reserve division in the backwaters of Siberia were summoned to hear a confidential presentation by a young major, who had come all the way from the General Staff in Moscow. What the major said astonished them. In Moscow’s view, the Soviet Union’s chief enemy was not the capitalist West, but the nominally-communist Chinese. War with China was inevitable. This war would be unlike that for which they had prepared in many ways: most important, the Chinese would have numerical superiority. The major showed charts of populations, troop strength, and other statistics making this point. As China grew more populous, it would grow stronger and more acquisitive. Fortunately, the major continued, there was a precedent for a numerically-inferior army defeating a larger enemy. He then presented a detailed analysis of Israeli performance in the 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars. By emulating Israeli tactics and dispositions, the Red Army could crush the Chinese. Future training would be along these lines. The major then asked if the reservists had any questions.
“Comrade Major, do we have enough Jews?”
